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Abstract
Causality is typically treated an all-or-nothing concept; either A is a cause of
B or it is not. We extend the definition of causality introduced by Halpern and
Pearl [2001a] to take into account the degree of responsibility of A for B. For
example, if someone wins an election 11–0, then each person who votes for him is
less responsiblefor the victory than if he had won 6–5. We then define a notion
of degree of blame, which takes into account an agent’s epistemic state. Roughly
speaking, the degree of blame of A for B is the expected degree of responsibility of
A for B, taken over the epistemic state of an agent.
∗Supported in part by NSF under grant CTC-0208535 and by the DoD Multidisciplinary University
Research Initiative (MURI) program administered by ONR under grant N00014-01-1-0795.
1 Introduction
There have been many attempts to define causality going back to Hume [1739], and
continuing to the present (see, for example, [Collins, Hall, and Paul 2003; Pearl 2000] for
some recent work). While many definitions of causality have been proposed, all of them
treat causality is treated as an all-or-nothing concept. That is, A is either a cause of B or
it is not. As a consequence, thinking only in terms of causality does not at times allow us
to make distinctions that we may want to make. For example, suppose that Mr. B wins
an election against Mr. G by a vote of 11–0. Each of the people who voted for Mr. B is
a cause of him winning. However, it seems that their degree of responsibility should not
be as great as in the case when Mr. B wins 6–5.
In this paper, we present a definition of responsibility that takes this distinction into
account. The definition is an extension of a definition of causality introduced by Halpern
and Pearl [2001a]. Like many other definitions of causality going back to Hume [1739],
this definition is based on counterfactual dependence. Roughly speaking, A is a cause
of B if, had A not happened (this is the counterfactual condition, since A did in fact
happen) then B would not have happened. As is well known, this naive definition does
not capture all the subtleties involved with causality. (If it did, there would be far fewer
papers in the philosophy literature!) In the case of the 6–5 vote, it is clear that, according
to this definition, each of the voters for Mr. B is a cause of him winning, since if they had
voted against Mr. B, he would have lost. On the other hand, in the case of the 11-0 vote,
there are no causes according to the naive counterfactual definition. A change of one vote
does not makes no difference. Indeed, in this case, we do say in natural language that the
cause is somewhat “diffuse”.
While in this case the standard counterfactual definition may not seem quite so prob-
lematic, the following example (taken from [Hall 2003]) shows that things can be even
more subtle. Suppose that Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle.
Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accu-
rate, Billy’s would have shattered the bottle had Suzy not thrown. Thus, according to
the naive counterfactual definition, Suzy’s throw is not a cause of the bottle shattering.
This certainly seems counter to intuition.
Both problems are dealt with the same way in [Halpern and Pearl 2001a]. Roughly
speaking, the idea is that A is a cause of B if B counterfactually depends on C under some
contingency. For example, voter 1 is a cause of Mr. B winning even if the vote is 11–0
because, under the contingency that 5 of the other voters had voted for Mr. G instead,
voter 1’s vote would have become critical; if he had then changed his vote, Mr. B would
not have won. Similarly, Suzy’s throw is the cause of the bottle shattering because the
bottle shattering counterfactually depends on Suzy’s throw, under the contingency that
Billy doesn’t throw. (There are further subtleties in the definition that guarantee that,
if things are modeled appropriately, Billy’s throw is not a cause. These are discussed in
Section 2.)
It is precisely this consideration of contingencies that lets us define degree of respon-
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sibility. We take the degree of responsibility of A for B to be 1/(N + 1), where N is the
minimal number of changes that have to be made to obtain a contingency where B coun-
terfactually depends on A. (If A is not a cause of B, then the degree of responsibility is 0.)
In particular, this means that in the case of the 11–0 vote, the degree of responsibility of
any voter for the victory is 1/6, since 5 changes have to be made before a vote is critical.
If the vote were 1001–0, the degree of responsibility of any voter would be 1/501. On the
other hand, if the vote is 5–4, then the degree of responsibility of each voter for Mr. B for
Mr. B’s victory is 1; each voter is critical. As we would expect, those voters who voted
for Mr. G have degree of responsibility 0 for Mr. B’s victory, since they are not causes of
the victory. Finally, in the case of Suzy and Billy, even though Suzy is the only cause of
the bottle shattering, Suzy’s degree of responsibility is 1/2, while Billy’s is 0. Thus, the
degree of responsibility measures to some extent whether or not there are other potential
causes.
When determining responsibility, it is assumed that everything relevant about the
facts of the world and how the world works (which we characterize in terms of what are
called structural equations) is known. For example, when saying that voter 1 has degree
of responsibility 1/6 for Mr. B’s win when the vote is 11–0, we assume that the vote and
the procedure for determining a winner (majority wins) is known. There is no uncertainty
about this. Just as with causality, there is no difficulty in talking about the probability
that someone has a certain degree of responsibility by putting a probability distribution on
the way the world could be and how it works. But this misses out on important component
of determining what we call here blame: the epistemic state. Consider a doctor who treats
a patient with a particular drug resulting in the patient’s death. The doctor’s treatment
is a cause of the patient’s death; indeed, the doctor may well bear degree of responsibility
1 for the death. However, if the doctor had no idea that the treatment had adverse side
effects for people with high blood pressure, he should perhaps not be held to blame for the
death. Actually, in legal arguments, it may not be so relevant what the doctor actually
did or did not know, but what he should have known. Thus, rather than considering the
doctor’s actual epistemic state, it may be more important to consider what his epistemic
state should have been. But, in any case, if we are trying to determine whether the doctor
is to blame for the patient’s death, we must take into account the doctor’s epistemic state.
We present a definition of blame that considers whether agent a performing action b
is to blame for an outcome ϕ. The definition is relative to an epistemic state for a, which
is taken, roughly speaking, to be a set of situations before action b is performed, together
with a probability on them. The degree of blame is then essentially the expected degree
of responsibility of action b for ϕ (except that we ignore situations where ϕ was already
true or b was already performed). To understand the difference between responsibility and
blame, suppose that there is a firing squad consisting of ten excellent marksmen. Only
one of them has live bullets in his rifle; the rest have blanks. The marksmen do not know
which of them has the live bullets. The marksmen shoot at the prisoner and he dies. The
only marksman that is the cause of the prisoner’s death is the one with the live bullets.
That marksman has degree of responsibility 1 for the death; all the rest have degree of
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responsibility 0. However, each of the marksmen has degree of blame 1/10.1
While we believe that our definitions of responsibility and blame are reasonable, they
certainly do not capture all the connotations of these words as used in the literature.
In the philosophy literature, papers on responsibility typically are concerned with moral
responsibility (see, for example, [Zimmerman 1988]). Our definitions, by design, do not
take into account intentions or possible alternative actions, both of which seem necessary
in dealing with moral issues. For example, there is no question that Truman was in
part responsible and to blame for the deaths resulting from dropping the atom bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, to decide whether this is a morally reprehensible
act, it is also necessary to consider the alternative actions he could have performed, and
their possible outcomes. While our definitions do not directly address these moral issues,
we believe that they may be helpful in elucidating them. Shafer [2001] discusses a notion
of responsibility that seems somewhat in the spirit of our notion of blame, especially in
that he views responsibility as being based (in part) on causality. However, he does not
give a formal definition of responsibility, so it is hard to compare our definitions to his.
However, there are some significant technical differences between his notion of causality
(discussed in [Shafer 1996]) and that on which our notions are based. We suspect that
any notion of responsibility or blame that he would define would be different from ours.
We return to these issues in Section 5.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the basic defini-
tions of causal models based on structural equations, which are the basis for our defini-
tions of responsibility and blame. In Section 3, we review the definition of causality from
[Halpern and Pearl 2001a], and show how it can be modified to give a definition of respon-
sibility. We show that the definition of responsibility gives reasonable answer in a number
of cases, and briefly discuss how it can be used in program verification (see [Chockler,
Halpern, and Kupferman 2003]). In Section 3.3, we give our definition of blame. In Sec-
tion 4, we discuss the complexity of computing responsibility and blame. We conclude in
Section 5 with some discussion of responsibility and blame.
2 Causal Models: A Review
In this section, we review the details of the definitions of causal models from [Halpern
and Pearl 2001a]. This section is essentially identical to the corresponding section in
[Chockler, Halpern, and Kupferman 2003]; the material is largely taken from [Halpern
and Pearl 2001a].
A signature is a tuple S = 〈U ,V,R〉, where U is a finite set of exogenous variables,
V is a set of endogenous variables, and R associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V a
nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y . Intuitively, the exogenous variables are ones
whose values are determined by factors outside the model, while the endogenous variables
1We thank Tim Williamson for this example.
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are ones whose values are ultimately determined by the exogenous variables. A causal
model over signature S is a tuple M = 〈S,F〉, where F associates with every endogenous
variable X ∈ V a function FX such that FX : (×U∈UR(U)× (×Y ∈V\{X}R(Y )))→ R(X).
That is, FX describes how the value of the endogenous variable X is determined by the
values of all other variables in U ∪V. If R(Y ) contains only two values for each Y ∈ U ∪V,
then we say that M is a binary causal model.
We can describe (some salient features of) a causal model M using a causal network.
This is a graph with nodes corresponding to the random variables in V and an edge from
a node labeled X to one labeled Y if FY depends on the value of X . Intuitively, variables
can have a causal effect only on their descendants in the causal network; if Y is not a
descendant of X , then a change in the value of X has no affect on the value of Y . For
ease of exposition, we restrict attention to what are called recursive models. These are
ones whose associated causal network is a directed acyclic graph (that is, a graph that
has no cycle of edges). Actually, it suffices for our purposes that, for each setting ~u for
the variables in U , there is no cycle among the edges of causal network. We call a setting
~u for the variables in U a context. It should be clear that if M is a recursive causal model,
then there is always a unique solution to the equations in M , given a context.
The equations determined by {FX : X ∈ V} can be thought of as representing
processes (or mechanisms) by which values are assigned to variables. For example, if
FX(Y, Z, U) = Y + U (which we usually write as X = Y + U), then if Y = 3 and U = 2,
then X = 5, regardless of how Z is set. This equation also gives counterfactual informa-
tion. It says that, in the context U = 4, if Y were 4, then X would be u + 4, regardless
of what value X , Y , and Z actually take in the real world.
While the equations for a given problem are typically obvious, the choice of variables
may not be. For example, consider the rock-throwing example from the introduction. In
this case, a naive model might have an exogenous variable U that encapsulates whatever
background factors cause Suzy and Billy to decide to throw the rock (the details of U do
not matter, since we are interested only in the context where U ’s value is such that both
Suzy and Billy throw), a variable ST for Suzy throws (ST = 1 if Suzy throws, and ST = 0
if she doesn’t), a variable BT for Billy throws, and a variable BS for bottle shatters. In
the naive model, whose graph is given in Figure 1, BS is 1 if one of ST and BT is 1.
(Note that the graph omits the exogenous variable U , since it plays no role. In the graph,
there is an arrow from variable X to variable Y if the value of Y depends on the value of
X .)
ST
BT
BS
Figure 1: A naive model for the rock-throwing example.
This causal model does not distinguish between Suzy and Billy’s rocks hitting the
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bottle simultaneously and Suzy’s rock hitting first. A more sophisticated model might
also include variables SH and BH, for Suzy’s rock hits the bottle and Billy’s rock hits the
bottle. Clearly BS is 1 iff one of SH and BH is 1. However, now, SH is 1 if ST is 1, and
BH = 1 if BT = 1 and SH = 0. Thus, Billy’s throw hits if Billy throws and Suzy’s rock
doesn’t hit. This model is described by the following graph, where we implicitly assume
a context where Suzy throws first, so there is an edge from SH to BH, but not one in the
other direction.
ST
BT
BS
SH
BH
Figure 2: A better model for the rock-throwing example.
Given a causal model M = (S,F), a (possibly empty) vector ~X of variables in V,
and vectors ~x and ~u of values for the variables in ~X and U , respectively, we can define a
new causal model denoted M ~X←~x over the signature S ~X = (U ,V −
~X,R|V− ~X). Formally,
M ~X←~x = (S ~X ,F
~X←~x), where F
~X←~x
Y is obtained from FY by setting the values of the
variables in ~X to ~x. Intuitively, this is the causal model that results when the variables
in ~X are set to ~x by some external action that affects only the variables in ~X; we do
not model the action or its causes explicitly. For example, if M is the more sophisticated
model for the rock-throwing example, thenMST←0 is the model where Suzy doesn’t throw.
Given a signature S = (U ,V,R), a formula of the form X = x, for X ∈ V and
x ∈ R(X), is called a primitive event. A basic causal formula has the form [Y1 ←
y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ, where
• ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive events;
• Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in V; and
• yi ∈ R(Yi).
Such a formula is abbreviated as [~Y ← ~y]ϕ. The special case where k = 0 is abbreviated
as ϕ. Intuitively, [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ says that ϕ holds in the counterfactual world
that would arise if Yi is set to yi, i = 1, . . . , k. A causal formula is a Boolean combination
of basic causal formulas.
A causal formula ϕ is true or false in a causal model, given a context. We write
(M,~u) |= ϕ if ϕ is true in causal model M given context ~u. (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x)
if the variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with recursive models)
solution to the equations in M~Y←~y in context ~u (that is, the unique vector of values for
the exogenous variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations F
~Y←~y
Z , Z ∈ V− ~Y , with
the variables in U set to ~u). We extend the definition to arbitrary causal formulas in the
obvious way.
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3 Causality and Responsibility
3.1 Causality
We start with the definition of cause from [Halpern and Pearl 2001a].
Definition 3.1 (Cause) We say that ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if the following
three conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ.
AC2. There exist a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and some setting (~x′, ~w′) of the
variables in ( ~X, ~W ) such that if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for Z ∈ ~Z, then
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w′]¬ϕ. That is, changing ( ~X, ~W ) from (~x, ~w) to
(~x′, ~w′) changes ϕ from true to false.
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w′, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z. That is, setting
~W to ~w′ should have no effect on ϕ as long as ~X has the value ~x, even if all
the variables in an arbitrary subset of ~Z are set to their original values in the
context ~u.
AC3. ( ~X = ~x) is minimal, that is, no subset of ~X satisfies AC2.
AC1 just says that A cannot be a cause of B unless both A and B are true, while AC3
is a minimality condition to prevent, for example, Suzy throwing the rock and sneezing
from being a cause of the bottle shattering. Eiter and Lukasiewicz [2002b] showed that
one consequence of AC3 is that causes can always be taken to be single conjuncts. Thus,
from here on in, we talk about X = x being the cause of ϕ, rather than ~X = ~x being the
cause. The core of this definition lies in AC2. Informally, the variables in ~Z should be
thought of as describing the “active causal process” from X to ϕ. These are the variables
that mediate between X and ϕ. AC2(a) is reminiscent of the traditional counterfactual
criterion, according to which X = x is a cause of ϕ if change the value of X results in ϕ
being false. However, AC2(a) is more permissive than the traditional criterion; it allows
the dependence of ϕ on X to be tested under special structural contingencies, in which
the variables ~W are held constant at some setting ~w′. AC2(b) is an attempt to counteract
the “permissiveness” of AC2(a) with regard to structural contingencies. Essentially, it
ensures that X alone suffices to bring about the change from ϕ to ¬ϕ; setting ~W to ~w′
merely eliminates spurious side effects that tend to mask the action of X .
To understand the role of AC2(b), consider the rock-throwing example again. In
the model in Figure 1, it is easy to see that both Suzy and Billy are causes of the bottle
shattering. Taking ~Z = {ST, BS}, consider the structural contingency where Billy doesn’t
throw (BT = 0). Clearly [ST ← 0,BT ← 0]BS = 0 and [ST ← 1,BT ← 0]BS = 1 both
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hold, so Suzy is a cause of the bottle shattering. A symmetric argument shows that Billy
is also a cause.
But now consider the model described in Figure 2. It is still the case that Suzy is a
cause in this model. We can take ~Z = {ST, SH, BS} and again consider the contingency
where Billy doesn’t throw. However, Billy is not a cause of the bottle shattering. For
suppose that we now take ~Z = {BT,BH, BS} and consider the contingency where Suzy
doesn’t throw. Clearly AC2(a) holds, since if Billy doesn’t throw (under this contingency),
then the bottle doesn’t shatter. However, AC2(b) does not hold. Since BH ∈ ~Z, if we set
BH to 0 (it’s original value), then AC2(b) requires that [BT← 1, ST← 0,BH← 0](BS =
1) hold, but it does not. Similar arguments show that no other choice of (~Z, ~W ) makes
Billy’s throw a cause.
In [Halpern and Pearl 2001a], a slightly more refined definition of causality is also
considered, where there is a set of allowable settings for the endogenous settings, and
the only contingencies that can be considered in AC2(b) are ones where the settings
( ~W = ~w′, ~X = ~x′) and ( ~W = ~w′, ~X = ~x) are allowable. The intuition here is that we do
not want to have causality demonstrated by an “unreasonable” contingency. For example,
in the rock throwing example, we may not want to allow a setting where ST = 0, BT = 1,
and BH = 0, since this means that Suzy doesn’t throw, Billy does, and yet Billy doesn’t hit
the bottle; this setting contradicts the assumption that Billy’s throw is perfectly accurate.
We return to this point later.
3.2 Responsibility
The definition of responsibility in causal models extends the definition of causality.
Definition 3.2 (Degree of Responsibility) The degree of responsibility of X = x for
ϕ in (M,~u), denoted dr((M,~u), (X = x), ϕ), is 0 if X = x is not a cause of ϕ in (M,~u);
it is 1/(k+ 1) if X = x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) and there exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) and
setting (x′, ~w′) for which AC2 holds such that (a) k variables in ~W have different values in
~w′ than they do in the context ~u and (b) there is no partition (~Z ′, ~W ′) and setting (x′′, ~w′′)
satisfying AC2 such that only k′ < k variables have different values in ~w′′ than they do
the context ~u.
Intuitively, dr((M,~u), (X = x), ϕ) measures the minimal number of changes that have
to be made in ~u in order to make ϕ counterfactually depend on X . If no partition of
V to (~Z, ~W ) makes ϕ counterfactually depend on (X = x), then the minimal number
of changes in ~u in Definition 3.2 is taken to have cardinality ∞, and thus the degree of
responsibility of X = x is 0. If ϕ counterfactually depends on X = x, that is, changing
the value of X alone falsifies ϕ in (M,~u), then the degree of responsibility of X = x in
ϕ is 1. In other cases the degree of responsibility is strictly between 0 and 1. Note that
X = x is a cause of ϕ iff the degree of responsibility of X = x for ϕ is greater than 0.
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Example 3.3 Consider the voting example from the introduction. Suppose there are 11
voters. Voter i is represented by a variable Xi, i = 1, . . . , 11; the outcome is represented
by the variable O, which is 1 if Mr. B wins and 0 if Mr. B wins. In the context where
Mr. B wins 11–0, it is easy to check that each voter is a cause of the victory (that is
Xi = 1 is a cause of O = 1, for i = 1, . . . , 11). However, the degree of responsibility of
Xi = 1 for is O = 1 is just 1/6, since at least five other voters must change their votes
before changing Xi to 0 results in O = 0. But now consider the context where Mr. B wins
6–5. Again, each voter who votes for Mr. B is a cause of him winning. However, now
each of these voters have degree of responsibility 1. That is, if Xi = 1, changing Xi to 0
is already enough to make O = 0; no other variables need to change.
Example 3.4 It is easy to see that Suzy’s throw has degree of responsibility 1/2 for the
bottle shattering in the naive model described in Figure 1; Suzy’s throw becomes critical
in the contingency where Billy does not throw. In the “better” model of Figure 2, Suzy’s
degree of responsibility is 1. If we take ~W to consist of {BT,BH}, and keep both variables
at their current setting (that is, consider the contingency where BT = 1 and BH = 0),
then Suzy’s throw becomes critical; if she throws, the bottle shatters, and if she does not
throw, the bottle does not shatter (since BH = 0). As we suggested earlier, the setting
(ST = 0,BT = 1,BH = 0) may be a somewhat unreasonable one to consider, since it
requires Billy’s throw to miss. If the setting (BH = 1, ST = 0,BH = 0) is not allowable,
then we cannot consider this contingency. In that case, Suzy’s degree of responsibility is
again 1/2, since we must consider the contingency where Billy does not throw. Thus, the
restriction to allowable settings allows us to capture what seems like a significant intuition
here.
As we mentioned in the introduction, in a companion paper [Chockler, Halpern, and
Kupferman 2003] we apply our notion of responsibility to program verification. The idea
is to determine the degree of responsibility of the setting of each state for the satisfaction
of a specification in a given system. For example, given a specification of the form ✸p
(eventually p is true), if p is true in only one state of the verified system, then that state
has degree of responsibility 1 for the specification. On the other hand, if p is true in three
states, each state only has degree of responsibility 1/3. Experience has shown that if
there are many states with low degree of responsibility for a specification, then either the
specification is incomplete (perhaps p really did have to happen three times, in which case
the specification should have said so), or there is a problem with the system generated by
the program, since it has redundant states.
The degree of responsibility can also be used to provide a measure of the degree of
fault-tolerance in a system. If a component is critical to an outcome, it will have degree of
responsibility 1. To ensure fault tolerance, we need to make sure that no component has a
high degree of responsibility for an outcome. Going back to the example of ✸p, the degree
of responsibility of 1/3 for a state means that the system is robust to the simultaneous
failures of at most two states.
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3.3 Blame
The definitions of both causality and responsibility assume that the context and the
structural equations are given; there is no uncertainty. We are often interested in assigning
a degree of blame to an action. This assignment depends on the epistemic state of the
agent before the action was performed. Intuitively, if the agent had no reason to believe,
before he performed the action, that his action would result in a particular outcome, then
he should not be held to blame for the outcome (even if in fact his action caused the
outcome).
There are two significant sources of uncertainty for an agent who is contemplating
performing an action:
• what the true situation is (that is, what value various variables have); for example,
a doctor may be uncertain about whether a patient has high blood pressure.
• how the world works; for example, a doctor may be uncertain about the side effects
of a given medication;
In our framework, the “true situation” is determined by the context; “how the world
works” is determined by the structural equations. Thus, we model an agent’s uncertainty
by a pair (K,Pr), where K is a set of pairs of the form (M,~u), where M is a causal model
and ~u is a context, and Pr is a probability distribution over K. Following [Halpern and
Pearl 2001b], who used such epistemic states in the definition of explanation, we call a
pair (M,~u) a situation.
We think of K as describing the situations that the agent considers possible before X
is set to x. The degree of blame that setting X to x has for ϕ is then the expected degree
of responsibility of X = x for ϕ in (MX←x, ~u), taken over the situations (M,~u) ∈ K. Note
that the situation (MX←x, ~u) for (M,~u) ∈ K are those that the agent considers possible
after X is set to x.
Definition 3.5 (Blame) The degree of blame of settingX to x for ϕ relative to epistemic
state (K,Pr), denoted db(K,Pr, X ← x, ϕ), is
∑
(M,~u)∈K
dr((MX←x, ~u), X = x, ϕ) Pr((M,~u)).
Example 3.6 Suppose that we are trying to compute the degree of blame of Suzy’s
throwing the rock for the bottle shattering. Suppose that the only causal model that
Suzy considers possible is essentially like that of Figure 2, with some minor modifications:
BT can now take on three values, say 0, 1, 2; as before, if BT = 0 then Billy doesn’t
throw, if BT = 1, then Billy does throw, and if BT = 2, then Billy throws extra hard.
Assume that the causal model is such that if BT = 1, then Suzy’s rock will hit the bottle
first, but if BT = 2, they will hit simultaneously. Thus, SH = 1 if ST = 1, and BH = 1 if
BT = 1 and SH = 0 or if BT = 2. Call this structural model M .
At time 0, Suzy considers the following four situations equally likely:
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• (M,~u1), where ~u1 is such that Billy already threw at time 0 (and hence the bottle
is shattered);
• (M,~u2), where the bottle was whole before Suzy’s throw, and Billy throws extra
hard, so Billy’s throw and Suzy’s throw hit the bottle simultaneously (this essentially
gives the model in Figure 1);
• (M,~u3), where the bottle was whole before Suzy’s throw, and Suzy’s throw hit
before Billy’s throw (this essentially gives the model in Figure 2); and
• (M,~u4), where the bottle was whole before Suzy’s throw, and Billy did not throw.
The bottle is already shattered in (M,~u1) before Suzy’s action, so Suzy’s throw is not a
cause of the bottle shattering, and her degree of responsibility for the shattered bottle
is 0. As discussed earlier, the degree of responsibility of Suzy’s throw for the bottle
shattering is 1/2 in (M,~u2) and 1 in both (M,~u3) and ((M,~u4). Thus, the degree of
blame is 1
4
· 1
2
+ 1
4
· 1 + 1
4
· 1 = 5
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. If we further require that the contingencies in AC2(b)
involve only allowable settings, and assume that the setting (ST = 0,BT = 1,BH = 0) is
not allowable, then the degree of responsibility of Suzy’s throw in (M,~u3) is 1/2; in this
case, the degree of blame is 1
4
· 1
2
+ 1
4
· 1
2
+ 1
4
· 1 = 1
2
.
Example 3.7 Consider again the example of the firing squad with ten excellent marks-
men. Suppose that marksman 1 knows that exactly one marksman has a live bullet in his
rifle, and that all the marksmen will shoot. Thus, he considers 10 augmented situations
possible, depending on who has the bullet. Let pi be his prior probability that marksman
i has the live bullet. Then the degree of blame of his shot for the death is pi. The degree
of responsibility is either 1 or 0, depending on whether or not he actually had the live
bullet. Thus, it is possible for the degree of responsibility to be 1 and the degree of blame
to be 0 (if he mistakenly ascribes probability 0 to his having the live bullet, when in fact
he does), and it is possible for the degree of responsibility to be 0 and the degree of blame
to be 1 (if he mistakenly ascribes probability 1 to his having the bullet when he in fact
does not).
Example 3.8 The previous example suggests that both degree of blame and degree of
responsibility may be relevant in a legal setting. Another issue that is relevant in legal
settings is whether to consider actual epistemic state or to consider what the epistemic
state should have been. The former is relevant when considering intent. To see the
relevance of the latter, consider a patient who dies as a result of being treated by a doctor
with a particular drug. Assume that the patient died due to the drug’s adverse side effects
on people with high blood pressure and, for simplicity, that this was the only cause of
death.Suppose that the doctor was not aware of the drug’s adverse side effects. (Formally,
this means that he does not consider possible a situation with a causal model where taking
the drug causes death.) Then, relative to the doctor’s actual epistemic state, the doctor’s
degree of blame will be 0. However, a lawyer might argue in court that the doctor should
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have known that treatment had adverse side effects for patients with high blood pressure
(because this is well documented in the literature) and thus should have checked the
patient’s blood pressure. If the doctor had performed this test, he would of course have
known that the patient had high blood pressure. With respect to the resulting epistemic
state, the doctor’s degree of blame for the death is quite high. Of course, the lawyer’s job
is to convince the court that the latter epistemic state is the appropriate one to consider
when assigning degree of blame.
Our definition of blame considers the epistemic state of the agent before the action was
performed. It is also of interest to consider the expected degree of responsibility after the
action was performed. To understand the differences, again consider consider the patient
who dies as a result of being treated by a doctor with a particular drug. The doctor’s
epistemic state after the patient’s death is likely to be quite different from her epistemic
state before the patient’s death. She may still consider it possible that the patient died for
reasons other than the treatment, but will consider causal structures where the treatment
was a cause of death more likely. Thus, the doctor will likely have higher degree of blame
relative to her epistemic state after the treatment.
Interestingly, all three epistemic states (the epistemic state that an agent actually
has before performing an action, the epistemic state that the agent should have had
before performing the action, and the epistemic state after performing the action) have
been considered relevant to determining responsibility according to different legal theories
[Hart and Honore´ 1985, p. 482].
4 The Complexity of Computing Responsibility and
Blame
In this section we present complexity results for computing the degree of responsibility
and blame for general recursive models.
4.1 The complexity of computing responsibility
Complexity results for computing causality were presented by Eiter and Lukasiewicz
[2002a, 2002b]. They showed that the problem of detecting whether X = x is an ac-
tual cause of ϕ is ΣP2 -complete for general recursive models and NP-complete for binary
models [Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002b]. (Recall that ΣP2 is the second level of the poly-
nomial hierarchy and that binary models are ones where all random variables can take
on exactly two values.) There is a similar gap between the complexity of computing the
degree of responsibility and blame in general models and in binary models.
For a complexity class A, FPA[logn] consists of all functions that can be computed by
a polynomial-time Turing machine with an oracle for a problem in A, which on input
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x asks a total of O(log |x|) queries (cf. [Papadimitriou 1984]). We show that computing
the degree of responsibility of X = x for ϕ in arbitrary models is FPΣ
P
2 [logn]-complete.
It is shown in [Chockler, Halpern, and Kupferman 2003] that computing the degree of
responsibility in binary models is FPNP[logn]-complete.
Since there are no known natural FPΣ
P
2 [logn]-complete problems, the first step in show-
ing that computing the degree of responsibility is FPΣ
P
2 [logn]-complete is to define an
FPΣ
P
2 [logn]-complete problem. We start by defining one that we call MAXQSAT2.
Recall that a quantified Boolean formula [Stockmeyer 1977] (QBF) has the form
∀X1∃X2 . . . ψ, where X1, X2, . . . are propositional variables and ψ is a propositional for-
mula. A QBF is closed if it has no free propositional variables. TQBF consists of the
closed QBF formulas that are true. For example, ∀X∃Y (X ⇒ Y ) ∈ TQBF. As shown
by Stockmeyer [1977], the following problem QSAT2 is Σ
P
2 -complete:
QSAT2 = {∃X∀Y ψ(X, Y ) ∈ TQBF : ψ ∈ 3−CNF}.
That is, QSAT2 is the language of all true QBFs of the form ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ, where ψ is a Boolean
formula in 3-CNF.
A witness f for a true closed QBF ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ is an assignment f to ~X under which
∀~Y ψ is true. We define MAXQSAT2 as the problem of computing the maximal number
of variables in ~X that can be assigned 1 in a witness for ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ. Formally, given a QBF
Φ = ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ, define MAXQSAT2(Φ) to be k if there exists a witness for Φ that assigns
exactly k of the variables in ~X the value 1, and every other witness for Φ assigns at most
k′ ≤ k variables in ~X the value 1. If Φ /∈ QSAT2, then MAXQSAT2(Φ) = −1.
Theorem 4.1 MAXQSAT2 is FP
ΣP2 [logn]-complete.
Proof: First we prove that MAXQSAT2 is in FP
ΣP2 [logn] by describing an algorithm in
FPΣ
P
2 [logn] for solving MAXQSAT2. The algorithm queries an oracle OL for the language
L, defined as follows:
L = {(Φ, k) : k ≥ 0, MAXQSAT2(Φ) ≥ k}.
It is easy to see that L ∈ ΣP2 : if Φ has the form ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ, guess an assignment f that
assigns at least k variables in ~X the value 1 and check whether f is a witness for Φ. Note
that this amounts to checking the validity of ψ with each variable in ~X replaced by its
value according to f , so this check is in co-NP, as required. It follows that the language
L is in ΣP2 . (In fact, it is only a slight variant of QSAT2.) Given Φ, the algorithm for
computing MAXQSAT2(Φ) first checks if Φ ∈ QSAT2 by making a query with k = 0. If
it is not, then MAXQSAT2(Φ) is −1. If it is, the algorithm performs a binary search for
its value, each time dividing the range of possible values by 2 according to the answer of
OL. The number of possible values of MAXQSAT2(Φ) is then |X|+2 (all values between
−1 and |X| are possible), so the algorithm asks OL at most ⌈logn⌉ + 1 queries.
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Now we show that MAXQSAT2 is FP
ΣP2 [logn]-hard by describing a generic reduction
from a problem in FPΣ
P
2 [logn] to MAXQSAT2. Let f : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a function in
FPΣ
P
2 [logn]. That is, there exists a deterministic oracle Turing machine Mf that on input
w outputs f(w) for each w ∈ Σ∗, operates in time at most |w|c for a constant c ≥ 0, and
queries an oracle for the language QSAT2 at most d log |w| times (for all sufficiently large
inputs w) during the execution. We now describe a reduction from f to MAXQSAT2.
Since this is a reduction between function problems, we have to give two polynomial-
time functions r and s such that for every input w, we have that r(w) is a QBF and
s(MAXQSAT2(r(w))) = f(w).
We start by describing a deterministic polynomial Turing machineMr that on input w
computes r(w). On input w of length n, Mr starts by simulating Mf on w. At some step
during the simulation Mf asks its first oracle query q1. The query q1 is a QBF ∃~Y1∀~Z1ψ1.
The machine Mr cannot figure out the answer to q1, thus it writes q1 down and continues
with the simulation. Since Mr does not know the answer, it has to simulate the run of
Mf for both possible answers of the oracle. The machine Mr continues in this fashion,
keeping track of all possible executions of Mf on w for each sequence of answers to the
oracle queries. Note that a sequence of answers to oracle queries uniquely characterizes
a specific execution of Mf (of length n
c). Since there are 2d logn = nd possible sequences
of answers, Mr on w has to simulate n possible executions of Mf on w, thus the running
time of this step is bounded by O(nc+d).
The set of possible executions ofMf can be viewed as a tree of height d logn (ignoring
the computation between queries to the oracle). There are at most nd+1 queries on this
tree. These queries have the form ∃~Yi∀~Ziψi, for i = 1, . . . , n
d+1. We can assume without
loss of generality that these formulas involve pairwise disjoint sets of variables.
Each execution of Mf on w involves at most d logn queries from this collection. Let
Xj be a variable that describes the answer to the jth query in an execution, for 1 ≤
j ≤ d logn. (Of course, which query Xj is the answer to depends on the execution.)
Each of the nd possible assignments to the variables X1, . . . , Xd logn can be thought of
as representing a number a ∈ {0, . . . , nd − 1} in binary. Let ζa be the formula that
characterizes the assignment to these variables corresponding to the number a. That is,
ζa = ∧
d logn
j=1 X
a
j , where X
a
j is Xj if the jth bit of a is 1 in a and ¬Xj otherwise. Under
the interpretation of Xj as determining the answer the query j, each such assignment a
determines an execution of Mf . Note that the assignment corresponding to the highest
number a for which all the queries corresponding to bits of a that are 1 are true is the
one that corresponds to the actual execution of Mf . For suppose that this is not the
case. That is, suppose that the actual execution of Mf corresponds to some a
′ < a. Since
a′ < a, there exists a bit Xj that is 1 in a and is 0 in a
′. By our choice of a, the query
∃~Yi∀~Ziψ corresponding to Xj is a true QBF, thus a Σ
P
2 -oracle that Mf queries should
have answered “yes” to this query, and we reach a contradiction.
The next formula provides the connection between the Xis and the queries. It says
that if ζa is true, then all the queries corresponding to the bits that are 1 in a must be true
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QBF. For each assignment a, let a1, . . . , aNa be the queries that were answered “YES”
during the execution of the Mf corresponding to a. Note that Na ≤ d logn. Define
η =
∧nd−1
a=0 (ζa ⇒ ∃~Ya1∀~Za1ψa1 ∧ . . .∃~YaNa∀
~Zalog nψaNa ).
The variables ~Yai,
~Zai do not appear in the formula η outside of ψai , thus we can
re-write η as
η = ∃~Y1, . . . , ~Ynd, . . . , ∀~Z1, . . . , ~Zndη
′,
where
η′ =
nd−1∧
a=0
ζa ⇒ (ψa1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψalog n).
The idea now is to use MAXQSAT2 to compute the highest-numbered assignment a
such that all the queries corresponding to bits that are 1 in a are true. To do this, it is
useful to express the number a in unary. Let U1, . . . , Und be fresh variables. Note that
U1, . . . , Und represent a number in unary if there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that Ui = 1 for
each i < j and Ui = 0 for each i ≥ j. Let ξ express the fact that the Uis represent the
same number as X1, . . . , Xd logn, but in unary:
ξ =
nd∧
i=1
(¬Ui ⇒ ¬Ui+1)
∧
(¬U1 ⇒ (X
0
1∧. . .∧X
0
log n))∧
nd−1∧
a=1
[(Ua∧¬Ua+1)⇒ (X
a
1∧. . .∧X
a
d logn)].
Let Φ = ∃U1, . . . , Und, X1, . . . , Xd logn(η ∧ ξ). Note that the size of Φ is polynomial in
n and, for each i, the variables ~Yi and ~Zi do not appear in ϕ outside of η. Thus, we can
rewrite Φ in the following form:
Φ = ∃U1, . . . , Und , X1, . . . , Xd logn, ~Y1, . . . , ~Ynd∀~Z1, . . . , ~Znd(η
′ ∧ ξ).
Thus, Φ has the form ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ.
We are interested in the witness for Φ that makes the most Ui’s true, since this will
tell us the execution actually followed by Mf . While MAXQSAT2 gives us the maxi-
mal number of variables that can be assigned true in a witness for Φ, this is not quite
the information we need. Assume for now that we have a machine that is capable of
computing a slightly generalized version of MAXQSAT2. We denote this version by SUB-
SET MAXQSAT2 and define it as a maximal number of 1’s in a witness computed for
a given subset of variables (and not for the whole set as MAXQSAT2). Formally, given
a QBF Ψ = ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ and a set ~Z ⊆ ~X , we define SUBSET MAXQSAT2(Ψ, ~Z) as the
maximal number of variables from ~Z assigned 1 in a witness for Ψ, or −1 if Ψ is not in
TQBF.
Clearly, SUBSET MAXQSAT2(Φ, ~U) gives us the assignment which determines the
execution of Mf . Let r(w) = Φ. Let s be the function that extracts f(w) from SUB-
SET MAXQSAT2(Φ, {U1, . . . , Un}). (This can be done in polynomial time, since f(w)
can be computed in polynomial time, given the answers to the oracle.)
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It remains to show how to reduce SUBSET MAXQSAT2 to MAXQSAT2. Given a
formula Ψ = ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ and a set ~Z ⊆ ~X , we compute SUBSET MAXQSAT2(Ψ, ~Z) in
the following way. Let ~U = ~X \ ~Z. For each Ui ∈ ~U we add a variable U
′
i . Let
~U ′
be the set of all the U ′i variables. Define the formula Ψ
′ as ∃ ~X ~U ′∀~Y (ψ ∧
∧
Ui∈U(Ui ⇔
¬U ′i)). Clearly, in all consistent assignments to ~X ∪ ~U
′ exactly half of the variables in
~U ∪ ~U ′ are assigned 1. Thus, the witness that assigns MAXQSAT2(Ψ
′) variables the
value 1 also assigns SUBSET MAXQSAT2(Ψ, ~Z) variables from ~Z the value 1. The value
SUBSET MAXQSAT2(Ψ, ~Z) is computed by subtracting |~U | from MAXQSAT2(Ψ
′).
Much like MAXQSAT2, we define MINQSAT2(∃ ~X∀~Y ψ) to be the minimum number
of variables in ~X that can be assigned 1 in a witness for ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ if there is such a witness,
and | ~X|+1 otherwise. This problem has the same complexity as MAXQSAT2, as we now
show.
Lemma 4.2 MINQSAT2 is FP
ΣP2 [logn]-complete.
Proof: For a Boolean formula ψ in 3-CNF, let ψ be the same formula, except that each
propositional variable X is replaced by its negation. It is easy to see that
MAXQSAT2(∃ ~X∀~Y ψ) = | ~X| −MINQSAT2(∃ ~X∀~Y ψ).
Thus, MINQSAT2 and MAXQSAT2 are polynomially reducible to each other and there-
fore, by Theorem 4.1, MINQSAT2 is FP
ΣP2 [logn]-complete.
We are now ready to prove FPΣ
P
2 [logn]-completeness of computing the degree of respon-
sibility for general recursive models.
Theorem 4.3 Computing the degree of responsibility is FPΣ
P
2 [logn]-complete in general
recursive models.
Proof: First we prove membership in FPΣ
P
2 [logn] by describing an algorithm in FPΣ
P
2 [logn]
for computing the degree of responsibility. Consider the oracle OL for the language L,
defined as follows:
L = {〈(M,~u), (X = x), ϕ, i〉 : 0 ≥ i ≥ 1, and dr((M,~u), (X = x), ϕ) ≥ i}.
In other words, 〈(M,~u), (X = x), ϕ, i〉 ∈ L for i > 0 if there is a partition (~Z, ~W ) and
setting (x′, ~w′) satisfying condition AC2 in Definition 3.1 such that at most 1/i−1 variables
in W have values different in ~w′ from their value in the context ~u. It is easy to see that
L ∈ ΣP2 . Given as input a situation (M,~u), X = x (where X is an exogenous variable inM
and x ∈ R(X)), and a formula ϕ, the algorithm for computing the degree of responsibility
uses the oracle to perform a binary search on the value of dr((M,~u), (X = x), ϕ), each
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time dividing the range of possible values for the degree of responsibility by 2 according
to the answer of OL. The number of possible candidates for the degree of responsibility is
n−|X|+1, where n is the number of endogenous variables inM . Thus, the algorithm runs
in linear time (and logarithmic space) in the size of the input and uses at most ⌈logn⌉
oracle queries. Note that the number of oracle queries depends only on the number of
endogenous variables in the model, and not on any other features of the input.
The proof that computing the degree of responsibility is FPΣ
P
2 [logn]-hard essentially
follows from an argument in [Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002a] showing that QSAT2 can be
reduced to the problem of detecting causality. In fact, their argument actually provides a
reduction from MINQSAT2 to the degree of responsibility. We now describe the reduction
in more detail. Given as input a closed QBF Φ = ∃ ~A∀ ~Bϕ, where ϕ is a propositional
formula, define the situation (M,~u) as follows. M = ((U ,V,R),F), where
• U consists of the single variable E;
• V consists of the variables ~A ∪ ~B ∪ {C,X}, where C and X are fresh variables;
• R is defined so that each variable S ∈ ~A ∪ {C,X} has range R(S) = {0, 1}, while
each variable S ∈ ~B has range R(S) = {0, 1, 2};
• F is defined so that FS = C +X for S ∈ ~B and FS = 0 for S ∈ V − ~B.
Let ~u be the context in which E is set to 0. Note that every variable in V has value 0 in
context ~u. (This would also be true in the context where E is set to 1; the context plays
no role here.) Let
ψ = (ϕ′ ∧
∧
S∈ ~B
S 6= 2) ∨ (C = 0) ∨ (X = 1 ∧ C = 1 ∧
∨
S∈ ~B
S 6= 2),
where ϕ′ is obtained from ϕ by replacing each variable S ∈ ~A ∪ ~B in ϕ by S = 1. It is
shown in [Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002a] thatX = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M,~u) iff Φ ∈ TQBF.
We now extend their argument to show that the degree of responsibility of X = 0 for ψ
is actually 1/(MINQSAT2(Φ) + 2).
Assume first that (X = 0) is a cause of ψ in (M,~u). Then there exists a partition
(~Z, ~W ) of V and a setting ~w of ~W such that (M,u) |= [X ← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ and (M,u) |=
[X ← 0, ~W ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~0]ψ, where ~Z ′ is as in AC2(b). (Since every variable gets value 0
in context ~u, the ~z∗ of AC2(b) becomes ~0 here.) Suppose that ~W is a minimal set that
satisfies these conditions.
Eiter and Lukasiewicz show that ~B ∩ ~W = ∅. To prove this, suppose that S ∈ ~B ∩ ~W .
If S is set to either 0 or 1 in ~w, then (M,u) 6|= [ ~W ← ~w,X ← 1]¬ψ, since the clause
(X = 1 ∧ C = 1 ∧
∨
S∈ ~B S 6= 2) will be satisfied. On the other hand, if S is set to 2 in w,
then (M,u) 6|= [ ~W ← ~w,X ← 0]ψ. Thus, ~B ∩ ~W = ∅. It follows that ~W ⊆ ~A ∪ {C}, and
so ~Z ⊆ B ∪ {X}. Moreover, C ∈ ~W , since C has to be set to 1 in order to falsify ψ.
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Note that every variable in ~W is set to 1 in ~w. This is obvious for C. If there is some
variable S in ~W ∩ ~A that is set to 0 in ~w, we could take S out of ~W while still satisfying
condition AC2 in Definition 3.1, since every variable S in ~W ∩ ~A has value 0 in context
~u and can only be 1 if it is set to 1 in ~w. This contradicts the minimality of W . To show
that Φ ∈ TQBF, consider the truth assignment v that sets a variable S ∈ ~A true iff S is
set to 1 in ~W . It suffices to show that v |= ∀ ~Bϕ. Let v′ be any truth assignment that
agrees with v on the variables in ~A. We must show that v′ |= ϕ. Let ~Z ′ consist of all
variables S ∈ ~B such that v′(S) is false. Since (M,u) |= [X ← 0, ~W ← ~1, ~Z ′ ← ~0]ψ, it
follows that (M,u) |= [X ← 0, ~W ← ~1, ~Z ′ ← ~0]ϕ′. It is easy to check that if every variable
in ~W is set to 1, X is set to 0, and ~Z ′ is set to ~0, then every variable in ~A ∪ ~B gets the
same value as it does in v′. Thus, v′ |= ϕ. It follows that Φ ∈ TQBF. This argument also
shows that there is a a witness for Φ (i.e., valuation which makes ∀ ~Bϕ true) that assigns
the value true to all the variables in ~W ∩ ~A, and only to these variables.
Now suppose that if Φ ∈ TQBF and let v be a witness for Φ. Let ~W consist of C
together with the variables S ∈ ~A such that v(S) is true. Let ~w set all the variables
in ~W to 1. It is easy to see X = 0 is a cause of ψ, using this choice of ~W and ~w
for AC2. Clearly (M,u) |= [X ← 1, ~W ← ~1]¬ψ, since setting X to 1 and and all
variables in ~W to 1 causes all variables in ~B to have the value 2. On the other hand,
(M,u) |= [X ← 0, ~W ← ~1, ~Z ′ ← 0]ψ, since setting X to 0 and ~W ← ~w guarantees that
all variables in ~B have the value 1 and ϕ′ is satisfied. It now follows that a minimal set
~W satisfying AC2 consists of C together with a minimal set of variables in ~A that are
true in a witness for Φ. Thus, | ~W | = MINQSAT2(Φ) + 1, and we have dr((M,~u), (X =
0), ψ) = 1/(| ~W |+ 1) = 1/(MINQSAT2(Φ) + 2).
4.2 The complexity of computing blame
Given an epistemic state (K,Pr), where K consists of N possible augmented situations,
each with at most n random variables, the straightforward way to compute db(K,Pr, X ←
x, ϕ) is by computing dr((MX←x,~Y←~y, ~u), X = x, ϕ) for each (M,~u,
~Y ← ~y) ∈ K such that
(M,~u) |= X 6= x ∧ ¬ϕ, and then computing the expected degree of responsibility with
respect to these situations, as in Definition 3.5. Recall that the degree of responsibility
in each model M is determined by a binary search, and uses at most ⌈log nM⌉ queries
to the oracle, where nM is the number of endogenous variables in M . Since there are N
augmented situations in K, we get a polynomial time algorithm with
∑N
i=1⌈log ni⌉ oracle
queries. Thus, it is clear that the number of queries is at most the size of the input,
and is also at most N⌈log n∗⌉, where n∗ is the maximum number of endogenous variables
that appear in any of the N augmented situations in K. The type of oracle depends on
whether the models are binary or general. For binary models it is enough to have an NP
oracle, whereas for general models we need a ΣP2 -oracle.
It follows from the discussion above that the problem of computing the degree of blame
in general models FPΣ
P
2 [n], where n is the size of the input. However, the best lower bound
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we can prove is FPΣ
P
2 [logn], by reducing the problem of computing responsibility to that
of computing blame; indeed, the degree of responsibility can be viewed as a special case
of the degree of blame with the epistemic state consisting of only one situation. Similarly,
lower and upper bounds of FPNP[logn] and FPNP[n] hold for binary models.
An alternative characterization of the complexity of computing blame can be given
by considering the complexity classes FP
ΣP2
|| and FP
NP
|| , which consist of all functions that
can be computed in polynomial time with parallel (i.e., non-adaptive) queries to a ΣP2
(respectively, NP) oracle. (For background on these complexity classes see [Jenner and
Toran 1995; Johnson 1990].) Using FP
ΣP2
|| and FP
NP
|| , we can get matching upper and
lower bounds.
Theorem 4.4 The problem of computing blame in recursive causal models is FP
ΣP2
|| -
complete. The problem is FPNP|| -complete in binary causal models.
Proof: As we have observed, the naive algorithm for computing the degree of blame
uses N logn∗ queries, where N is the number of augmented situations in the epistemic
state, and n∗ is the maximum number of variables in each one. However, the answers
to oracle queries for one situation do not affect the choice of queries for other situations,
thus queries for different situations can be asked in parallel. The queries for one situation
are adaptive, however, as shown in [Jenner and Toran 1995], a logarithmic number of
adaptive queries can be replaced with a polynomial number of non-adaptive queries by
asking all possible combinations of queries in parallel. Thus, the problem of computing
blame is in FP
ΣP2
|| for arbitrary recursive models, and in FP
NP
|| for binary causal models.
For hardness in the case of arbitrary recursive models, we provide a reduction from the
following FP
ΣP2
|| -complete problem [Jenner and Toran 1995; Eiter and Lukasiewicz 2002a].
Given N closed QBFs Φ1, . . . ,ΦN , where Φi = ∃ ~Ai∀ ~Biϕi and ϕi is a propositional formula
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N of size O(n), compute the vector (v1, . . . , vN) ∈ {0, 1}
N such that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we have that vi = 1 iff Φi ∈ TQBF . Without loss of generality, we assume
that all ~Ai’s and ~Bi’s are disjoint. We construct an epistemic state (K,Pr), a formula
ϕ, and a variable X such that (v1, . . . , vN ) can be computed in polynomial time from
the degree of blame of setting X to 1 for ϕ relative to (K,Pr). K consists of the N + 1
augmented situations (Mi, ~ui, ∅), i = 1, . . . , N + 1. Each of the models M1, . . . ,MN+1 is
of size O(Nn) and involves all the variables that appear in the causal models constructed
in the hardness part of the proof of Theorem 4.3, together with fresh random variables
num1, . . . , numN+1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the equations for the variables in Φi in the situation
(Mi, ~ui) at time 1 are the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.3. Thus, Φi ∈ TQBF iffX = 1
is a cause of ϕi in (Mi, ~ui) at time 1. In addition, for i = 1, . . . , n, in (Mi, ~ui) at time 1, the
equations are such that numi and numN+1 are set to 1 and all other variables (i.e., numj
for j /∈ {i, N1} and all the variables in Φj , j 6= i) are set to 0; at time 0, the equations are
such that all variables are set to 0. The situation (MN+1, ~uN+1) is such that all variables
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are set to 0 at both times 0 and 1. Let Pr(Mi, ~ui) = 1/2
i(⌈log n⌉) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and let
Pr(MN+1, ~uN+1) = 1− Σ
N
i=11/2
i(⌈logn⌉). Finally, let ϕ =
∧N
i=1(numi → ϕi) ∧ numN+1.
Clearly ϕ is 0 in all the N + 1 situations at time 0 (since numN+1 is false at time 0
in all these situations). At time 1, ϕ is true in (Mi, ~ui), i = 1, . . . , N , iff X = 1 is a cause
of ϕi, and ϕ is false in (MN+1, ~uN+1). Thus, the degree of blame db(K,Pr, X ← x, ϕ) is
an N⌈log n⌉-bit fraction, where the ith group of bits of size n is not 0 iff Φi ∈ TQBF.
It immediately follows that the vector (v1, . . . , vN) can be extracted from db(K,Pr, X ←
x, ϕ) by assigning vi the value 1 iff the bits in the ith group in db(K,Pr, X ← x, ϕ) are
not all 0.
We can similarly prove that computing degree of blame in binary models is FPNP|| -hard
by reduction from the problem of determining which of N given propositional formulas
of size O(n) are satisfiable. We leave details to the reader.
5 Discussion
We have introduced definition of responsibility and blame, based on Halpern and Pearl’s
definition of causality. We cannot say that a definition is “right” or “wrong”, but we
can and should examine the how useful a definition is, particularly the extent to which it
captures our intuitions.
There has been extensive discussion of causality in the philosophy literature, and many
examples demonstrating the subtlety of the notion. (These examples have mainly been
formulated to show problems with various definitions of causality that have been proposed
in the literature.) Thus, one useful strategy for arguing that a definition of causality is
useful is to show that it can handle these examples well. This was in fact done for Halpern
and Pearl’s definition of causality (see [Halpern and Pearl 2001a]). While we were not able
to find a corresponding body of examples for responsibility and blame in the philosophy
literature, there is a large body of examples in the legal literature (see, for example, [Hart
and Honore´ 1985]). We plan to do a more careful analysis of how our framework can be
used for legal reasoning in future work. For now, we just briefly discuss some relevant
issues.
While we believe that “responsibility” and “blame” as we have defined them are impor-
tant, distinct notions, the words “responsibility” and “blame” are often used interchange-
ably in natural language. It is not always obvious which notion is more appropriate in
any given situation. For example, Shafer [2001] says that “a child who pokes at a gun’s
trigger out of curiosity will not be held culpable for resulting injury or death”. Suppose
that a child does in fact poke a gun’s trigger and, as a result, his father dies. According to
our definition, the child certainly is a cause of his father’s death (his father’s not leaving
the safety catch on might also be a cause, of course), and has degree of responsibility 1.
However, under reasonable assumptions about his epistemic state, the child might well
have degree of blame 0. So, although we would say that the child is responsible for his
father’s death, he is not to blame. Shafer talks about the need to take intention into
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account when assessing culpability. In our definition, we take intention into account to
some extent by considering the agent’s epistemic state. For example, if the child did not
consider it possible that pulling the trigger would result in his father’s death, then surely
he had no intention of causing his father’s death. However, to really capture intention,
we need a more detailed modeled of motivation and preferences.
Shafer [2001] also discusses the probability of assessing responsibility in cases such as
the following.
Example 5.1 Suppose Joe sprays insecticide on his corn field. It is known that spraying
insecticide increases the probability of catching a cold from 20% to 30%. The cost of a
cold in terms of pain and lost productivity is $300. Suppose that Joe sprays insecticide
and, as a result, Glenn catches a cold. What should Joe pay?
Implicit in the story is a causal model of catching a cold, which is something like the
following.2 There are four variables:
• a random variable C (for contact) such that if C = 1 is Glenn is in casual contact
with someone who has a cold, and 0 otherwise.
• a random variable I (for immune) such that if I = 2, Glenn does not catch a cold
even if he both comes in contact with a cold sufferer and lives near a cornfield
sprayed with insecticide; if I = 1, Glenn does not catch a cold even if comes in
contact with a cold sufferer, provided he does not live near a cornfield sprayed with
insecticide; and if I = 0, then Glenn catches a cold if he comes in contact with a
cold sufferer, whether or not he lives near a cornfield sprayed with insecticide;
• a random variable S which is 1 if Glenn lives near a cornfield sprayed with insecticide
and 0 otherwise;
• a random variable CC which is 1 if Glenn catches a cold and 0 otherwise.
The causal equations are obvious: CC = 1 iff C = 1 and either I = 0 or I = 1 and S = 1.
The numbers suggest that for 70% of the population, I = 2, for 10%, I = 1, and for
20%, I = 0. Suppose that no one (including Glenn) knows whether I is 0, 1, or 2. Thus,
Glenn’s expected loss from a cold is $60 if Joe does not spray, and $90 if he does. The
difference of $30 is the economic cost to Glenn of Joe spraying (before we know whether
Glenn actually has a cold).
As Shafer points out, the law does not allow anyone to sue until there has been damage.
So consider the situation after Glenn catches a cold. Once Glenn catches a cold, it is clear
that I must be either 0 or 1. Based on the statisical information, I is twice as likely to
be 0 as 1. This leads to an obvious epistemic state, where the causal model where I = 0
is assigned probability 2/3 and the causal model where I = 1 is assigned probability 1/3.
2This is not the only reasonable causal model that could correspond to the story, but it is good enough
for our purposes.
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In the latter model, Joe’s spraying is not a cause of Glenn’s catching a cold; in the former
it is (and has degree of responsibility 1). Thus, Joe’s degree of blame for the cold is 1/3.
This suggests that, once Joe sprays and Glenn catches a cold, the economic damage is
$100.
This example also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the epistemic
states before and after the action is taken, an issue already discussed in Section 3.3.
Indeed, examining the situation after Glenn caught cold enables us to ascribe probability
0 to the situation where Glenn is immune, and thus increases Joe’s degree of blame for
Glenn’s cold.
Example 5.1 is a relatively easy one, since the degree of responsibility is 1. Things can
quickly get more complicated. Indeed, a great deal of legal theory is devoted to issues of
responsibility (the classic reference is [Hart and Honore´ 1985]). There are a number of
different legal principles that are applied in determining degree of responsibility; some of
these occasionally conflict (at least, they appear to conflict to a layman!). For example,
in some cases, legal practice (at least, American legal practice) does not really consider
degree of responsibility as we have defined it. Consider the rock throwing example, and
suppose the bottle belongs to Ned and is somewhat valuable; in fact, it is worth $100.
• Suppose both Suzy and Billy’s rock hit the bottle simultaneously, and all it takes is
one rock to shatter the bottle. Then they are both responsible for the shattering to
degree 1/2 (and both have degree of blame 1/2 if this model is commonly known).
Should both have to pay $50? What if they bear different degrees of responsibility?
Interestingly, a standard legal principle is also that “an individual defendant’s re-
sponsibility does not decrease just because another wrongdoer was also an actual
and proximate cause of the injury” (see [Public Trust 2003]). That is, our notion of
having a degree of responsibility less than one is considered inappropriate in some
cases in standard tort law, as is the notion of different degrees of responsibility. Note
that if Billy is broke and Suzy can afford $100, the doctrine of joint and several li-
ability, also a standard principle in American tort law, rules that Ned can recover
the full $100 from Suzy.
• Suppose that instead it requires two rocks to shatter the bottle. Should that case be
treated any differently? (Recall that, in this case, both Suzy and Billy have degree
of responsibility 1.)
• If Suzy’s rock hits first and it requires only one rock to shatter the bottle then, as we
have seen, Suzy has degree of responsibility 0 or 1/2 (depending on whether we con-
sider only allowable settings) and Billy has degree of responsibility 0. Nevertheless,
standard legal practice would probably judge Billy (in part) responsible.
In some cases, it seems that legal doctrine confounds what we have called cause, blame,
and responsibility. To take just one example from Hart and Honoree´ [1985, p. 74], assume
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that A throws a lighted cigarette into the bracken near a forest and a fire starts. Just as
the fire is about to go out, B deliberately pours oil on the flame. The fire spreads and
burns down the forest. Clearly B’s action was a cause of the forest fire. Was A’s action
also a cause of the forest fire? According to Hart and Honore´, he is not, whether or not
he intended to cause the fire; only B was. In our framework, it depends on the causal
model. If B would have started a fire anyway, whether or not A’s fire went out, then A is
indeed not the cause; if B would not have started a fire had he not seen A’s fire, then A is
a cause (as is B), although is degree of resonsibility for the fire is only 1/2. Furthermore,
A’s degree of blame may be quite low. Our framework lets us make distinctions here that
seem to be relevant for legal reasoning.
While these examples show that legal reasoning treats responsibility and blame some-
what differently from the way we do, we believe that a formal analysis of legal reasoning
using our definitions would be helpful, both in terms of clarifying the applicability of our
definitions and in terms of clarifying the basis for various legal judgments. As we said,
we hope to focus more on legal issues in future work.
Our notion of degree of responsibility focuses on when an action becomes critical.
Perhaps it may have been better termed a notion of “degree of criticality”. While we
believe that it is a useful notion, there are cases where a more refined notion may be
useful. For example, consider a voter who voted for Mr. B in the case of a 1-0 vote and a
voter who voted for Mr. B in the case of a 100-99 vote. In both case, that voter has degree
of responsibility 1. While it is true that, in both cases, that voter’s vote was critical, in
the second case, the voter may believe that his responsibility is more diffuse. We often
here statements like “Don’t just blame me; I wasn’t the only one who voted for him!” The
second author is current working with I. Gilboa on a definition of resonsibility that uses
the game-theoretic notion of Shapley value (see, for example, [Osborne and Rubinstein
1994]) to try to distinguish these examples.
As another example, suppose that one person dumps 900 pounds of garbage on a
porch and another dumps 100 pounds. The porch can only bear 999 pounds of load, so it
collapses. Both people here have degree of responsibility 1/2 according to our definition,
but there is an intuition that suggests that the person who dumped 900 pounds should
bear greater responsibliity. We can easily accommodate this in our framework by putting
weights on variables. If we use wt(X) to denote the weight of a X and wt( ~W ) to denote the
sum of the weights of variables in the set ~W , then we can define the degree of responsibility
of X = x for ϕ to be wt(X)/(wt( ~W ) + wt(X), where ~W is a set of minimal weight for
which AC2 holds. This definition agrees with the one we use if the weights of all variables
are 1, so this can be viewed as a generalization of our current definition.
These examples show that there is much more to be done in clarifying our understand-
ing of responsibility and blame. Because these notions are so central in law and morality,
we believe that doing so is quite worthwhile.
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